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EDITORIAL

I regret that this number has come out a little later than was intended, but I hope that it will reach you early in the New Year. This number, like the last two, is essentially composed of papers presented at the Durham conference in 2000: two papers drawn from the very lively panels on aid and development, by Assal and Harragin, offer some thoughts on the position of the academic scholar involved in development, and whether and how this involvement may ever be useful; Hassan Nuri el-Amin offers a useful summary of the problems facing the school education system, particularly with regard to the training of teachers.

I must once again urge readers: please do your best to ensure that we receive material for publication! And could I suggest one area in which many may be able to contribute: how many have memories - from a personal perspective - of major moments in the recent past of the Sudan? I should welcome accounts, from ordinary people, of how great political or cultural events appeared in daily life.

I hope that you enjoy reading this issue, and I look forward to hearing from you. And best wishes for 2002!

Justin Willis

Hon. Editor, *Sudan Studies*
Durham, December2001

DISPLACEMENT, AID AND THE PREDICAMENT OF THE ANTHROPOLOGIST: SOME REMARKS FROM SUDAN

By Munzoul Abdalla M. Assal

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Experts are addicts. They solve nothing! They are servants of whatever system hires them. They perpetuate it….When the world is destroyed it will be destroyed not by its madmen but by the sanity of its experts and the superior ignorance of its bureaucrats.
(John Le Carre, quoted in Morton 1994:1)

Academics are trained to criticise and are rewarded for it. Social scientists in particular are taught to argue and to find fault. University staff spend much of their time assessing essays, seminar presentations, and examination papers. Their mental set is evaluative. When it comes to…development, they look for faults. Their peers, too, award them higher marks for a study which points to the bad effects of a project than one which highlights benefits. Some social scientists have, in any case, an anti-government ideology and set out from the start to muck-rake.
(Chambers 1983: 30).

Introduction

The relationship between anthropology and development has been a subject of extensive discussion. A basic concern of such studies has been: how can anthropology be useful in the development process? In Sudan, Haaland (1982) and Ahmed (1983) attempted to show how and in what sense anthropology can aid development processes. Their concern was with anthropology and *development*. This paper will be concerned with

anthropology and *aid*. The link between aid and development is very obvious, but each one of them has different institutional linkages and contexts. In areas where anthropology is traditionally rooted, aid is becoming one important aspect of the life of people. It is an interesting and intriguing coincidence that these areas, to which anthropology owes a special debt of gratitude for its own development, are currently a scene of calamities and catastrophes, and constitute prime receivers of the so-called humanitarian aid, often channelled through a variety of agencies that are vaguely labelled Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). In the African context, the operations of NGOs came to be conspicuous during the early 1980s. This was also the case in Sudan where initially the operations of NGOs primarily focused on relief distribution. Subsequent to the 1984/85 drought, and after a slight recovery in Sudan, the activities of many NGOs were directed towards a highly rhetorical yet promising objective: community development.

NGO activities have caught the attention of a variety of researchers, by no means all anthropologists (Abdel Ati, 1988, 1993 and 2000, Tvedt 1994, 1995 and 1998a, and Marcussen 1996) but very little has been said about the studies on which NGOs' operations, and hence their own existence, are contingent, though there are those (cf. Haaland 1990 and Tvedt 1998b)[1] who ponder the possible adverse effects that might result from the so-called development oriented studies, more accurately called commissioned research. Humanitarian though the objectives of such studies may be, they may misrepresent the people that constitute the target of NGOs, which such studies are purported to serve. To this extent, it would be wishful thinking to

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[1] Both these studies were primarily conducted for NGOs (i.e. they are commissioned studies) operating in Eastern Sudan (Haaland 1990) and Southern Sudan (Tvedt 1998b). Both writers, however, have been involved for quite a long time in such issues (cf. Haaland 1982).

attempt planning development or whatever projects on the basis of such inadequate and/or preconceived research.

It is my belief that social anthropology has a great potential for providing agencies concerned with humanitarian aid with solid studies on which they could base those community development projects. Anthropologists have the potential to play an important role in baseline studies that map and document the relevant structures in the society (Manger 1985). Such potential, however, sinks deep in a rooted predicament and current challenges. Three decades ago anthropology was severely attacked, and anthropologists cursed and dismissed as "hand maiden" and "agents" of colonialism (cf. Asad 1972, 1973, Ahmed 1973, Magubane 1971, 1979, Mafeje 1996). Those attacks greatly influenced the subsequent paths and developments in the discipline, and while such vituperative attacks and counter-attacks have fallen out of favour with the increasing numbers of contemporary indigenous anthropologists who cannot be described as colonial agents in any honest or meaningful way, the discipline itself seems to be in turmoil and facing many challenges. Such challenges put anthropologists in a formidable predicament, especially when the anthropologist is dealing with powerful development agencies, reluctant bureaucrats and planners and, generally, unfavourable research conditions. My arguments in this paper should not be understood as either defending or favouring anthropology over other social sciences disciplines (although I reserve the right to do so). On the contrary, my arguments in this paper should be understood as general and critical comments from an insider who is disenchanted with some anthropological ways of representation. I shall argue that the relevance and importance of this paper stem not from its endeavour to reveal realities of the powerless people as they unfold- a classical anthropological objective - but from its

endeavour to show how it is important for anthropological inquiry to be directed towards powerful groups.

Against a convention of either implicitly praising NGOs (viewing them as "angels of mercy"- to borrow Tvedt's perceptive 1998a title) or explicitly criticising their ventures and weak interventions (Abdel Ati 1993, 2000), this paper will primarily focus on how anthropology can be useful for humanitarian assistance. The material on which this paper is based relates to the Sudanese context; specifically that of displaced persons in the peripheries of Khartoum, the national capital of Sudan. I shall also draw on my experience of being a member of a team hired by an NGO to study urban problems and formulate a strategy for the support of the urban poor in Khartoum. I shall start by a note on the phenomenon of displacement, and a short description of displaced persons in Khartoum. This will be the basis for a discussion of the political economy of research, bureaucracy and NGOs. The paper will conclude by pointing to the broader implications for anthropology and aid.

Displacement in Khartoum: Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations

The spatial and social displacement of people has been accelerating around the world; these movements include enormous numbers of people who are classified as displaced. Legally, the displaced are those people who are involuntarily driven from their original domicile to other areas. The UN provided a definition that differentiates between displaced persons in general (which can include refugees) and those who are internally displaced (IDPs). Internally displaced persons are:

> *Persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid, in particular, the effect of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or*

> *natural human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised border* (UN, quoted in Hampton 1998: xv).

Though it appears inclusive, this definition cannot be expected to be the basis for well-informed research on displacement, for it leads social scientists to see the displaced as an objectively self-delimiting field of study. But this is simply not the case. Forced population movements have extraordinarily diverse historical and political causes and involve people, who, while all displaced, find themselves in qualitatively different life situations and predicaments.[2] Thus, it would seem that the term displaced has analytical usefulness not as a label for generalisable type or kind of person or situation, but only as a broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes within it a world of different socioeconomic statuses, personal histories and many other aspects (Malkki 1995).

In the Sudanese context, the tendency, as it is generally the case in studies of displacement, is to lump up all categories of people under the rubric of displacement. Moreover, the misunderstanding of the phenomena is equally the result of the fact that research on displacement is carried out as part and parcel of a "disastrous situation". This kind of research is stimulated by *ad hoc* imperatives and in response to agencies concerned with aid (relief or otherwise). Coupled with shallow fieldwork that usually depends on statistical methods,[3] the results of such studies would certainly be a

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[2] This applies also in the case of "refugees", another equally mystified concept. Nationalism and racism, xenophobia, immigration policies, censorship and silencing are the main causes of refugeeness. In many studies of refugees, argues Malkki (1995:496), "these are the kind of background information or root causes that sometimes have been considered, for many reasons, beyond the scope of study". It is worth noting that Sudan also hosts hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighbouring African countries. A recent episode is the Eritrean refugees fleeing the Ethiopian invasion.

[3] I would be the last to suggest that statistical investigations are necessarily mistaken in aim or application, but they are certainly limited in scope. It is my thesis that there is a wide range of phenomena which are intrinsically inaccessible to statistical investigation of any kind. Some of the aspects discussed in the case studies provided in this paper (e.g. honour and shame) are such aspects that cannot be gauged by statistical contrivance. It is in this area of non-statistical social fact that the anthropologist is an expert.

fascinating brew and the end product is a pool of reports that hardly see light. By not revealing the different forms of displacement(s) and the differential impacts, researchers run the risk of preparing the wrong ammunition for governments and NGOs who will not know or recognise the legitimate rights or claims of the displaced persons.

I am not arguing that all research that is initiated or funded by aid agencies is of poor quality or not *value free*. There are many commendable efforts and brilliant exceptions in the studies of displacement in Sudan (cf. Haaland 1990, Ibrahim 1995, El Nagar 1993). All these studies are done for or in collaboration with, NGOs concerned with humanitarian assistance. While El Nagar (1993) investigated the effects of displacement on vulnerable groups, women and children, Ibrahim (1995) was concerned with the distinction between *spatial* and *socioeconomic* displacements and how each one of them exerts different impacts and corroborates unique manifestations. Haaland (1990) investigated the social and cultural traits of one of the notoriously drought-prone communities in the eastern part of Sudan. He underscored the importance of understanding such traits for any action aimed at sustainable development. Importantly however, Haaland's account, while providing clear description and analysis about the studied community (the Hadendowa of Derudeib in Eastern Sudan[4]), highlighted many crucial yet neglected aspects that directly impinge on development projects or aid endeavours. These included research ethics, development agencies, political power, the role of the elite and the political economy of development in Sudan. He succinctly highlighted the difficulties involved in aid and development projects:

> *Aid projects attempting to break this vicious circle have to confront a multifaceted problem involving not only techno-economic and socio-cultural conditions, but also fundamental*

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[4] For detailed accounts about this part of the Sudan and the recent involvement of NGOs see Manger et al 1996, Abdel Ati 1993 and Egeimi 1996.

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ethical dilemmas. It is easy to say that one must take poverty and environmental degradation into consideration in planning development projects; it is notoriously difficult to design a practical course of action which promotes economic growth and at the same time leads to a distribution of benefits which reach the poor (or other crosscutting target groups like women, minorities) without having the effects which undermine the ecological basis for viable adaptation" (Haaland 1990: 105)

For some scholars, phenomena like displacement are a manifestation of the processes rooted in the political economy of the country and, specifically, as a manifestation of proletarianisation processes operating in the traditional sector of the economy. Such processes alienate the countryside's inhabitants from their means of subsistence and ultimately transform them into wage seekers (Ahmed 1992, Ibrahim 1992, also see Daly 1993). This line of thinking, while not underestimating the role of war and other violent practices, views wars and violent practices (rampant tribal animosities and armed robbery) as results of a lopsided development that has served to perpetuate inequalities.

The early waves of displaced persons to the Greater Khartoum conurbation were drought victims who fled their original areas in Western Sudan in 1984/85 (notably the Kababish, Hamar, Maganin and other Dar Hamid tribes). They were resettled in the western part of Omdurman. While many of these early drought-displaced returned home after the slight recovery of 1988, others settled permanently and engaged in the urban informal sector; a sector that in itself is saturated and stagnant (Awad 1995). Those affected by war in the south followed, reaching a peak during the mid-1990s. Statistically there are conflicting figures on the displaced. In 1989 the Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation gave an estimate of 4.1 million for the total number of the displaced. Out of this figure 1.8 million persons were located in Khartoum. In the same year, the National Dialogue Conference on Peace Issues gave an estimate of 3.5 million persons, 80 percent of whom

were in Khartoum. These different sources agree on one fact: the majority of the displaced are in Khartoum.

Putting aside such conflicting estimates, well-informed and dedicated anthropological research should be capable of clearly figuring out the differential impact of various forced movements subsumed under the umbrella of displacement. But before this, research should theoretically contest and delineate the concept of displacement itself. Basic to such an effort is the indispensable distinction between displacement as spatial/geographical movement and as a socioeconomic process. Viewing displacement as spatial/geographical movement mystifies the extent of impoverishment and destitution to which the displaced are subjected in the course of the crisis, or otherwise glosses over the fact that some of the self-reliant spatially displaced persons (merchants and civil servants, who have as well been displaced) are not subjected to impoverishment. Indeed, good research should be able to show how those self-reliant persons might have benefited from the experience of displacement. For instance, some individuals are displaced from southern Sudan, but they did not experience the kind of apathy that haunted ordinary displaced persons, nor were they included in the so-called displaced camps. Delineating such intricacies necessitates viewing displacement largely as a socioeconomic process: the alienation or dispossession of the displaced persons from their former means of subsistence and the uprooting of their cherished values. But researchers should resist the tendency to embrace a naive anthropological romanticisation that takes as its basic concern an endeavour to preserve the so-called traditional way of life or *indigenous cultures*.

The life-worlds of the displaced: living on the margins of the Khartoum urban system

My engagement with internally-displaced persons in Khartoum started in 1995 when I submitted a proposal to the Development Studies and Research Centre (DSRC) of the University of Khartoum to conduct a study on the impact of displacement on gender roles.[5] The findings of that study were published in the centre's series of discussion papers (Assal 1997). Although I went back to the camps in 1998 as a member of a team entrusted with studying urban problems and coming up with a strategy for urban poverty alleviation (Al-Battahani et al 1998)), this section will draw on Assal (1997). My initial concerns were to examine the nature of change in the economic activities of displaced females in particular. But other aspects sprang up during the course of fieldwork. These aspects included NGOs, politics, and ethnic/regional dichotomies. Constrained by fund and other considerations, however, I had to limit the investigation to only one of many displaced camps in Khartoum.

The camp is located 30 kilometres west of Omdurman. It is one of the four major provisional camps, and accommodates 30,000 displaced persons of different regional and ethnic backgrounds. Prominent groups in the camp include Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, Bari, Fur, Dar Hamid, Nuba and Azande. The inhabitants of this camp, like those of other camps, are lumped together after being forcefully evacuated from various slums and squatter settlements around the national capital. Ethnic clustering and segregation are noticeable features in the camp. Segregation and clustering are contrived to avoid conflict in a community that is abruptly formed from ethnically and culturally diverse groups. Amid tin cans, plastic bags and general urban

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[5] Actually my engagement with the displaced started earlier in 1993 in the capacity of a research assistant in a project on "Urban Poverty in Khartoum". Intensive interviews were conducted with 1500 displaced households, using questionnaires, in two major displaced camps in the peripheries of Khartoum. Subsequently I also assisted in the computing process and statistical manipulation of the data. However, for unknown reasons, that study has never seen light.

refuse, families scratch small patches, build shelters and crowd together. There is no running water, no latrine facilities, minimal health services and no electricity.[6] Water is provided by donkey-carts at very high prices. Most people in the camp live on the verge of absolute destitution, with no legal right to settlement and in most cases with no identification papers from authorities. Entrance to the camp is very much restricted for outsiders and a prior permission must be obtained from COD (Commission of the Displaced), and lately HAC (Humanitarian Assistance Commission), for any visit, especially visits for research purposes. Even after such permission is obtained, a researcher may encounter many inconveniences while doing his work from camp authorities or those who are supposed to keep *order* there. In a sense, the camp is a place of incarceration for the displaced, but paradoxically restriction is imposed on those who intend to enter and not on those who leave.

Income generating opportunities for the displaced are bleak. The capacity of the small market located at the centre of the camp to provide opportunities for the displaced is very limited, and the displaced, whose skills are either rooted in traditional subsistence agriculture or animal husbandry, compete with urbanites for the meagre opportunities in the urban informal sector. Displaced males are mostly engaged in the construction sector as daily wage labourers, while females engage in selling tea, food items or work as maids for middle and upper strata urbanites. While a full coverage of the activities undertaken by the displaced is not possible here, below are four cases of displaced women who are engaged in the marginal urban economy. The

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[6] MSF Holland is providing the material for pit latrines in the camp. It encourages people to dig their latrines by giving material incentives to those who dig their own latrines. On the other hand, the Red Cross provides drinking water through its fleet of tankers and operates a small health unit in the camp. The deplorable conditions in the cap mirror the urban poverty in Sudan (see Ahmed and Al-Battahani 1995). Conditions in other poor corners of Khartoum are no better than those in the camp.

emphasis was laid on women because NGOs' so-called income generating and empowering programmes are mainly directed towards women. Moreover, the displaced women are increasingly becoming caterers and breadwinners for their families. By presenting these four cases, however, I am neither calling for a form of *post-modern* anthropology, nor claiming that they represent the displaced persons; my aim is rather to elicit the effect of macro-level processes on the daily life of individuals. Throughout this paper, I am arguing for a form of *representation* that might better convey the lived experiences of people and help conceptualise what type of aid deems appropriate and what mechanisms are to be adopted for sustainability.

Case 1

> Halima, a Kababish woman in her late thirties, migrated to Khartoum with the waves of drought displaced in 1984/85. When she arrived she was not married. Her family, which is composed of three sisters, one brother and her parents, arrived during the same period. Three years later she got married to a displaced Kabashi fellow. Halima began work as a tea seller in Shaikh Abu Zeid market, a few metres from home. What was provided for them by the then operating NGOs was insufficient in a situation where both her father and brother had no permanent or dependable work. At the outset, she suffered a lot before she was able to persuade her father and brother to let her go for work. From a typical Kababish perspective or point of view, it is ignoble or "*aib*" for a woman to earn money through involvement in the market. For many of them, such involvement brings disgrace and shame for the family. She encountered her current husband in the workplace and they decided to marry on condition that he accepted her status quo. Later on Halima shifted to grilling meat in *Suq el-Naga*[7] (lit. camels' market). Currently she is employing two girls to assist her. Her mother takes care of the children during the day. Halima is content with her work and she believes that she is so far successful in securing the basic needs of her family.

Case 2

> Asha, 31 years old, is from Gabra, Northern Kordufan. She arrived with her husband and five children in 1991. They settled in Zagalona squatter

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[7] This is a very famous market in Omdurman where fresh meat is grilled by women who are mostly displaced. In fact, this market appeared a few years after the arrival of the drought-displaced.

settlement. A year later, Zagalona was demolished and the family was removed, with others, to El Salam camp. The husband is a construction worker who spends most of his time in work sites; sometimes he spends a whole week outside home. Asha is currently selling tea at Shaikh Abu Zeid market. Her daughter, 10 years old, who is not attending school, accompany her to the work place. Asha prepares meals for her children early in the morning before leaving to work. She argued that Gabra is more secure than *El Asima* (the capital, Khartoum) but life there is uncertain.

Case 3

Noura came to Khartoum from Kajmar, Northern Kordufan, with her family and other relatives. They lost their livestock on which they formerly depended. She got married soon after arrival. But the marriage could not survive because the husband insisted that Noura should not go to work, at a time when his income was insufficient to cover the requirements of the family. She is not willing to marry again because "marriage is a constraint for me", she argued. Comparing her previous situation with the current one, she argued that previously they suffered from uncertainty and insecurity, while here the future is unknown. She does not intend to go back.

Case 4

Amna is from the White Nile, 32 years old. Her family came to Omdurman in 1984. Four years later, the family returned to the previous home area. However, they were unable to continue there and as a result of the 1990/91 drought, they were compelled to migrate again to Omdurman. The husband is a regular soldier who is currently serving in the South. The half salary of the husband, which she is entitled to receive, is insufficient for her and her three children. Intermittently she receives help from her expatriate brother. Amna sells tea[8] in *Zaribat el-mawashi* (livestock market). She has no licence and occasionally she encounters difficulties during the course of her daily work. Her elder son (14 years old) left school and is currently selling cigarettes in the same area. Amna is worried about the fact that she does not possess her own home, and she might be relocated again to areas far from her workplace.

The above cases represent examples of how the forced movement exerted different effects on the displaced. Case (1) represents a situation where a displaced old-timer adapted to a new situation and succeeded in eking out a

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[8] Selling tea is one of the important and basic income-generating activities for women in urban Sudan. But the activity is not organised by the authorities. It is left to the whim and judgement of municipal personnel to decide on who is allowed to practice tea selling. This subjects women to perpetual episodes of harassment and confiscation of their property.

living. Case (3) clearly manifests the sorts of stresses the displaced face, the severe tests to which families are subjected and how displacement could lead to a total family collapse and disintegration. This disintegration manifests itself in different forms. It could be a complete separation of spouses (divorce), quarrels, and lack of control over children due to the absence of parents most of the time. While previously children and families were virtually protected by normative values and traditions, currently there is no such recourse, and the upbringing of children in the new milieu tends to be a problem in its own right. While previously men assumed direct responsibility for their families, many of them are now increasingly dependent on their female household members. Nevertheless, my first hand material suggests that the economic independence of females and the concomitant dependence of males have very little impact on the power structure in the household (case 3). This poses a serious challenge for many of the NGO projects targeting income-generating activities for displaced women. It also challenges a sweeping belief in the feminist literature that the economic independence of females necessarily takes them out of the margin and consequently leads to increasing their power (Kuiper and Sap 1995). What should be considered in the case of some displaced groups is not only economic dependence/independence but also the cultural construction of reality. The balance between these two aspects is not easy to strike, however. The beleaguered situation of the displaced is worsened by the state of uncertainty. The displaced are congregated in temporary camps. This seems to be a prelude to another yet-to-come process of relocation or repatriation to original areas. The temporariness of these camps is legitimised by the authorities' belief that the displaced are transient and if they are given permanent residential plots, they might simply sell these plots and creep again to areas where they can squat. However, the social/psychological

damage inflicted on the displaced receives very little attention and is not duly considered by those who are concerned with rehabilitation or repatriation programs. The very word displacement implies an assumption that all human populations belong in a certain place and that, ideally, they should be where they belong. Any other state of affairs is thus viewed as an anomaly. However, when considering displacement and the question of social and psychological distress among the displaced persons, it is necessary to remember that we are dealing with a set of empirical questions. Generalisations like "the experience of the displaced" can only mystify our understanding of the phenomenon and misguide policy formulations.

The status of the displaced is ambiguous and the Sudanese government's stand is ambivalent. The Ministry of Engineering Affairs executed a package of policies at the beginning of the 1990s regarding demolition, relocation, and upgrading of squatter settlements. This culminated in re-planning areas formerly occupied by squatters and the erection of camps in the outskirts of the capital. But the displaced still need to be provided with the basic and prime need (food) and means of sustainability. Relief distribution is easy, but enabling the displaced to command means of livelihood and sustainability is more elusive, for all the parties concerned. For the displaced, it is a dream that is yet to be fulfilled. For the government, it may not be a priority because the displaced themselves are dealt with on a temporary basis, or because of lack of financial resources. Taking the part of the NGOs, the scene is much more paradoxical and intriguing. NGOs are financially better off (at least according to my conceptualisation of aid provided at the beginning of this paper).[9] Their existence and the flow of funds from donors

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[9] One extreme example was in Darfur during the 1984-5 famine, when Save the Children Fund, a foreign NGO involved only in famine relief, had a budget for transport only, not counting the value of the food relief itself nor of the expatriate staff involved, in excess of the regional government's budget (Morton 1994: 48).

are ethically justified by the NGOs' contribution to the wellbeing of people whom they serve.

Most of the NGOs working in poor areas and displaced camps are seeking sustainability[10] through community development projects, including investing in poultry, goats, handicrafts and many other ventures. Yet, helping the displaced to command sources for their livelihood, and hence sustain themselves, if this is truly targeted at all, should reckon with the fact that displacement has long term associations and consequences that are not easily amenable to rectification. Some of these consequences, whose effects are likely to continue even if conditions leading to displacement change, include the disarticulation and social damage inflicted on those who survived the process of displacement. Accordingly, a thorough understanding of such realities is a prerequisite for any action meant to improve the lives of the displaced. But in order to clearly understand what is going on in a certain displaced community, the investigation should not be confined only to that community. It should include decision-making centres, the bureaucracy and the power system in general.

Researchers, bureaucracy and NGOs' triangle : a personal experience

The relationship between these three *partners* is tense and shaky. At best it is not good. Where all three are simultaneously involved, it normally becomes very difficult to do research; especially in countries like Sudan. Each one of them has its own interests and agendas that, more often than not, are not compatible with those of the two others. Researchers get involved as evaluators of projects or are recruited to carry out baseline studies or surveys

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[10] This is one of the most controversial concepts in the development literature. But generally the definition in the Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987: 43) "Our Common Future" is widely quoted: "sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their own needs"

that would be the basis for initiating projects. According to Chamber (1983: 34-5, my emphasis):

> Evaluation is called for but may be *regarded by managers as threat not support, while evaluators [academics] appear as spies, not allies*. When criticism is offered, or damaging information comes to light, there are several possible reactions. The hardest is to accept it and change course; others are to deny it, to try to keep it quiet, to buy off the critics or to coopt them into a public relations role. Morale may then be maintained, and selective perception and myth have their part to play in maintaining support, … but in the long run, the costs in benefits foregone and eventual disillusion may be high.

I participated as a member of a team employed by an NGO in 1997 to carry out research on urban problems. The objective was to come out with specific recommendations that would help planning projects aimed at urban poverty alleviation. During that period, the NGO was not directly involved in displaced camps or engaged in relief distribution of any sort. Rather, its efforts were aimed at assessing the strategies of the poor and providing help to strengthen their community based organisations. The team members were confronted with obstacles from both the bureaucratic apparatus and the NGO.

From the government's side, there was discouragement of any attempt to study the displaced.[11] The bureaucrats assumed that studies on displacement in the first place would reveal the ugly face of the 'proud country', at a time when the political slogan was 'authentication', while Khartoum State's slogan

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[11] While bureaucratic procedures greatly impede research that has something to do with NGOs or aid, it is equally important to note that the bureaucracy's reluctance is not completely unjustified. A November 1999 Norwegian television documentary, entitled "Weapons Smuggling in Sudan", has highlighted the role played by some aid agencies in logistically and politically perpetuating the Sudanese civil war. The documentary clearly outlined the actions of the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in supplying the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) with weapons in the course of the Sudanese civil war in the 1990s (Vapensmuglerne I Sudan, "Brennpunkt", NRK Television, Norway, 17 November 1999). But then it has also been proven that the Sudanese state itself has used food as a weapon in its war in the south and supported some of the warring factions in the tribal conflicts in western Sudan (Harir 1994, Abdel Ati 2000).

was 'beautification of the national capital'. Secondly, there was the belief that foreign NGOs' reports were not always used for their manifest declared objectives, but rather represented a platform for the continued presence of NGOs - a presence that is reluctantly accepted by the government. What is even worse is that the bureaucracy is sceptic even about indigenous researchers who may embrace nothing more than simple, and often naive, academic convictions. The bureaucrats seem to embrace Chamber's (1983: 30) claim that 'academics are trained to criticise and are taught to find fault'.[12] While the worries and concerns of the bureaucrats should be considered by researchers, I shall argue that an *anthropology of bureaucracy* is very much needed to help understand how bureaucrats and decision-makers think, particularly at times of crisis and stress.

The conditions from the side of NGO's authorities were not better than those of the bureaucrats. They wanted us to study urban problems (for me such problems are not simply urban at all) and provide guidelines for urban poverty alleviation in Greater Khartoum in a very short period of time. At the same time, we were expected *not to embarrass* the NGO, which means that we should not criticise the status quo or make indications of any possible government policy faults. While this experience with this specific NGO seems to be a special case, it does not seem unwarranted to contend that researchers are increasingly facing unfavourable conditions at a time when research is mostly funded by *development agencies* and the room for *free* and *independent* research is increasingly becoming slim.[13] This poses a

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[12] For unknown reasons, the Government of Sudan refused to allow the release and publication of Sudan's first Human Development Report that was sponsored by the UNDP. I was a member of the multidisciplinary team entrusted with the report in 1998. After a continuous work for more than six months the authorities denied the publication of the report. For difficulties facing researchers in displaced camps in particular see Hampton (1998; especially pages 84-87).

[13] Donors' agenda and "whim" are increasingly contributing to a fashioned voluntary work. According to Abdel Ati (2000, p. 13) "…issues of the environment, gender and more recently poverty became common

serious problem that relates to research ethics. I shall return to this point at the end of the paper. Let me now provide a glimpse of urban poverty in Khartoum, which has been described by Ahmed and Al-Battahani (1995) and defined, measured or quantified by Ali (1994 *and passim*) and Sahl (1999: 19-25)

Having overcome the red-tape and obstacles, and having come to terms with the NGO's caveats, the team focused on the four major displaced camps in Khartoum, in addition to a newly planned squatter settlement in Haj Yusuf quarter, Khartoum North. The realities in the other three displaced camps were found to be more or less similar to those in El Salam camp which I described above. Generically, it is possible to divide the urban poor into three categories. These include the usual or chronic urban poor that are found among the less educated and semi-skilled workers in the public and private sectors, the displaced persons, and the "new poor" who emerged recently as a result of economic liberalisation and adjustment policies. This last category is composed mainly of middle class urbanites. It has been found that 93.8 percent of the middle class in the public sector are below the poverty line (Sahl, 1999: 34). It has also been found that "69 percent of households in Khartoum are served by pit latrines while only 3 percent have public sewerage systems and 15 percent have no toilet facility of any sort" (Ahmed and El Battahani, 1995:197). The situation in the displaced camps is even more telling with regard to the extent of the poverty crisis. The team's investigation included sources of livelihood, livelihood diversification (or coping) strategies, and the role of community based organisations (CBOs). With regard to livelihoods, with the exception of El-Baraka neighbourhood

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agenda and characteristics of proposals and plans submitted to donors….Although, as real problems, these are legitimate areas for seeking support to tackle, in some cases they have been used by some NGOs, neither because of their conviction nor they have the required competence, but because that is what guarantees funding (what the donors want)".

in Haj Yusuf, households in all other camps almost completely depend on relief items provided by NGOs. Work opportunities are constrained firstly by the incapacity of the urban informal sector and secondly by the inadequate or irrelevant skills of the displaced persons. Displaced community based organisations, which were predominantly based on ethnicity and regionalism, represented a rudimentary type of civil society organs. But they were counteracted by powerful pro-government organisations (Women's Union, Youth Union, National Congress, etc.) which, according to one informant 'appear only during official gatherings and election campaigns and they usually act to the detriment of our voluntary organisations'. The ability of the displaced popular organisations to act as catalyst to the advancement of the wellbeing in the camps is thus limited.

Anthropology and Aid: broader implications

Earlier I argued that anthropology could provide aid agencies with solid studies on which they could base projects aimed at serving communities where these agencies operate. At the micro level, anthropologists should provide solid understanding about the social and cultural realities they reflect on, without prejudice or *a priori* stands. At median and macro levels, they have to distinguish between, understand, and identify, winners and losers. Although what anthropologists provide may not be used the way it should, it remains an ethical responsibility to record reality as it unfolds in the field. But is it easy to record reality as it unfolds? I shall try to provide answers to this question and explore anthropology's potential in the remaining part of the article.

A major contribution of the anthropologist is to reveal reality and suggest what should **not** be done. However, when it comes to the formulation of statements of what **should** be done, the anthropologist 'will be skating on a thin ice' and 'social scientists who claim that if planners only listen to their

advice, they have the guarantee for success, are just naive' (Haaland 1982:25). The implication here is that the contribution of the social anthropologist should be limiting the margin of error in aid projects aimed at community development, rather than producing a blueprint for development. Such a role should extend to account for the unintended or undesired consequences of, for instance, both displacement and aid. This would represent help for both aid concerned agencies and sceptic government bureaucrats who, most of the time, view anthropologists as problem-fosters and not solvers.

Let me go back to the displaced in Greater Khartoum. The first step towards understanding the complexity of displacement must start by a consorted fieldwork. Such fieldwork should seek, for example, to find out what concepts like *sharf* (honour) and *aib* (shame) mean for a community whose members are drawn from *conservative* rural Sudanese society, and how such concepts impinge on women's work.

This simple model is based on the conviction that realities are always interconnected and the ambition of any serious researcher is to be able to say something sensible about such interconnectedness. The case studies presented in this paper relate in the first instance to the basic life realities of the displaced women. Those realities cannot, and should not, be disentangled from other realities in an urban informal sector that subjects displaced women to all sorts of inconveniences (insecurity, harassment, low remuneration, etc.). Furthermore, these two levels are necessarily to be seen in the context of mounting economic and social crises in the country as a whole and, almost as equal, within the context of an urban upper class ideology that is hostile towards displaced persons. The evacuation of displaced persons to areas far from cities attests to such an ideology. The core of this ideology is that the displaced are responsible for all sorts of

urban problems (crime, alcoholism, congestion in public transport, threatening public peace and order, etc.), and as such they should go back to where they came from, or to their "home". But if 'home' is where one feels safe and at ease, instead of some essentialised point in the map, then it is far from clear that returning to where one fled from is the same thing as going home.

There are limits to what anthropologists or social scientists can offer. By unmasking interconnectedness, the anthropologist's crucial part is done. What remains is the dissemination of research findings to the users (the community in question, aid agencies, government bureaucracy as well as the academic community). The uses to which these findings will be directed are beyond the anthropologist's responsibility. But in the first place, can anthropologists carry out such a role successfully? In the First World (the North), anthropologists or social scientists in general are faced with institutional problems (Kapferer 2000) and other problems that relate to 'ethics of research'. Tvedt (1998b: 214) has clearly pointed out to this problem of ethics:

> In many OECD countries the most active research centres are often funded by the foreign ministry or by the aid bureaucracies themselves, as is definitely the case in Norway. In Norway development research has to a large extent been financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or by the Ministry for Development Co-operation. The ministries pay most of the bill for influential research centres and build up whole research programs for political purposes, institutions and programs that in some cases have become integrated parts of traditional university affairs.

Although some critics believe that Tvedt "seems to spend a lot of time in breaking open doors" (Tostensen, 1999:133), the pertinent point is that the association of researchers with such powerful institutions necessarily erodes research ethics. In the Third World (the South) development research is

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particularly contingent on other equally compelling circumstances. Let me quote Tvedt again:

> Academic freedom is weak in many of the so-called developing countries, not only because they live under oppressive regimes, but almost as important, because they also are even more dependent on funds from different aid donors than what we are.

Tvedt's point is that in the process of seeking to influence powerful aid agencies, development research may itself become influenced by the values of power and affluence to be found in these agencies. He believes that researchers should be autonomous and strive to understand the complexities of life in more profound ways than aid workers, politicians or media people are normally in a position to do.

However, to be autonomous neither implies to detach oneself from aid agencies or to try to be *absolutely* neutral. To detach oneself from funding agencies necessarily means to stop doing research. This is particularly the case with anthropology, the basis of which is prolonged fieldwork. To be neutral is synonymous with not making a moral commitment. This way of thinking implies that anthropology cannot concern itself only with powerless and marginal communities. Rather, it must look into the macro structures that impinge on powerless and marginal communities.

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KNOWLEDGE AND THE PRACTICE OF RELIEF IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

By Simon Harragin

Introduction

Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) has provided relief to the people of Sudan since 1989 - working on both sides of Africa's longest-running civil-war through OLS Northern sector, based out of Khartoum and OLS Southern sector, based in Kenya. Many people visiting the southern sector for the first time are impressed by the sheer amount that has been written about the work in the south.   There are reports on human rights (Africa Watch 1999), capacity building (Africa Rights 1995), restocking (Iles 1994), fishing, child-soldiers, cultural orientation material for new relief workers (Perner 1993), food-economy assessments for every region of the south (WFP 1995), performance reviews of OLS (Duffield et al 1996) and piles and piles of assessments.   Does all this material mean we have a good 'knowledge' of southern Sudan?

I wish to argue, that the material that exists on southern Sudan is, to quote Geertz, a 'model *for* reality' rather than a 'model of reality', where cultural forms have 'an intrinsic double aspect... they give meaning... to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves' (Geertz 1973:93). It exists to provide relief workers with a simplified picture on which to map out their preexisting prejudices and plans, but does not accurately reflect a world that exists independent of the world of relief. The model is defined by what relief workers can do about the situation rather than the situation itself (see DeWaal 1989). It thus reflects less than half of the real picture - and cannot predict how the system will operate in times of stress when relief is needed. Above all, the knowledge that aid workers have of Sudan is insufficient to be able to control the system, and prevent events such as the famine of 1998.

To achieve a more thorough knowledge of the south, outsiders should understand that they need to adopt a more open, more anthropological agenda. However well-crafted, a food-economy questionnaire, for example, it will never have the ability to expose unexpected, unsolicited information that an open-ended anthropological interview will have. There will always be a body of knowledge of local reality that such choreographed questioning will ignore, and that body of knowledge might well be the basis for decision-making in a crisis. In addition, while a more anthropological approach can show the existence of a rational decision-making framework functioning with a set of priorities very different from those of relief workers, it cannot act as a substitute for giving people control over their own decision-making processes. In short, relief workers can never hope to control events such as the famine of 1998 without engaging with the local people that such events affect.

Knowledge and relief in the south

Knowledge - in any context - does not exist in a vacuum. It is commissioned, published and acted upon within a very specific cultural milieu. In the context of relief, the available information is a very specific, and rather grubby, snapshot of what commissioning organisations chose to see. Often research in the context of relief reflects more about the cultural context of these commissioning organisations than the societies that they aim to represent. This is their fatal weakness, and the reason why, in most cases, they fail to comprise a body of data that really can have a beneficial impact on the practice of relief.

A healthy amount of time in the last few years in social anthropology has been spent examining the business of gathering 'knowledge' - using the insights of Clifford, Marcus, Said and Foucault, for example, to question the relationship between 'knowledge' and 'power', and concepts such as 'Orientalism' and representation. The dangers of misrepresenting a group of people because a researcher undertook his or her work with a specific agenda

in mind were amply displayed when Freeman deconstructed Margaret Mead's portrayal of adolescent bliss in Western Samoa. Even this, most basic of anthropological observations - the need to be constantly aware of ones own biases - does not seem to have affected the way that 'knowledge' is gathered in southern Sudan.

It is necessary to take as a *starting point* that human societies will misrepresent other societies - both voluntarily and involuntarily - as a necessary process of developing and justifying their own identity. Thus all research must begin with an awareness of this tendency to misrepresent other people. In defining southern Sudan as a recipient of aid and the West as the donor, one is simplifying relations between the two into a simple binary structure that leaves no place for beggars on the streets of London or world chess champions from the cattle camps of Sudan. Most players in this polarised world understand that they are playing roles. However, sometimes the position of being the donor fills the West with a kind of *hubris* - based on the idea that the West occupies a position of economic superiority because somehow it got something 'right' while the countries it assists got something 'wrong'. Thus it is justified in adopting the moral highground and prescribing solutions because of a perceived failure of local mechanisms (and hence leadership structures) to solve the problems without outside involvement.

Most of the time, this role-playing does not matter: southern Sudanese chess players do not accept the aid on the same terms that it is given. Aid is somehow destigmatised by sharing what was given for the orphans and cripples with all groups within the society - including men and soldiers. In any case the amounts given are so small, they are dwarfed by what local people produce for themselves - though they would never tell that to aid workers. However, Sudan is a country at war and, in bad years, relief could provide a vital fall-back mechanism, were it not for the fact that it is given on terms dictated by the West. During the crisis of 1998 in Bahr-el-Ghazal,

relief agencies were determined to use their own definition of a 'famine' and their own definition of a 'beneficiary' because they were conscious that they had been 'cheated' too many times in the past by the requests for help on behalf of the 'orphans and cripples' - the very roles that agencies had been asking beneficiaries to adopt.

What followed was a grotesque tussle over defining the number of people who needed help (see SCF 1999:63) and a struggle over the moral high-ground between the SPLM and OLS that suggested that this was a media public relations exercise rather than an exercise to avert starvation[14]. Was it diversion by the - SPLA or the slow reaction of OLS that was causing the hunger? Who was to blame for not averting the famine? (the more profound question that goes beyond the symptoms - who was to blame for causing the famine - was asked less often). In fact there seems to have been so little accountability for what went on in 1998 that it is tempting to think that agencies have some higher agenda to which they are answerable, such as perhaps ambassadors of western values, including peace and democracy, rather than the more mundane task of keeping people alive (c.f. Clare Short (1998) talks of a new 'rights-based humanitarianism [which is] not about discretionary assistance when the mood for benevolence takes us', which begs the question - what has happened to the 'humanitarian imperative?').

While the power-struggles were being acted out on a political level and were being resolved according to which group had the greater power to control information (the West), OLS were increasing by 100 times the amount of food being sent in to the south (SCF 1999:65), and were beginning to assist by August 1998 approaching the number of people that the SRRA had said needed help earlier in the year. They were thus recognising by their actions

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[14] An SPLM/SPLA press statement on 27th July 1998 read: 'rather than address these issues and shortcomings [double standards in food distributions], UNICEF/OLS is mounting a concerted media campaign to divert attention from its inability to mount an effective response to avert the humanitarian crisis by accusing the SPLM/A of food diversion' and 'attempting to portray that it cares more for our people than SPLM itself.

that they had been wrong in saying that there was no famine and blaming the diversion of food rather than the lack of food for the famine. Did the international community learn the lesson of this crisis - the fact that being rich and powerful does not mean that one is always right and that one does not need to consult local people who understand local conditions better? That will be clear when the next 'famine' comes along. However, the dispute over the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding in March 2000 reran many of the arguments used in 1998 - including the idea that the SPLM were getting in the way of agencies trying to reach the poor and the vulnerable, while the agencies were accused of not wanting to be held accountable for their poor performance by the SPLM. This would suggest that things have not changed very much. In other words, if the provision of relief in southern Sudan is to be improved, there needs to be a greater degree of self-knowledge and candour on behalf of all parties. Relief agencies have to admit the knowledge they do have -for example how to operate aeroplanes and dig boreholes - and the knowledge they do not have - such as how to divide up southerners from the outside into those who need relief and those who don't without their co-operation.

Towards a better knowledge for relief in southern Sudan

There was a greater introspection within anthropology during the 1980's and 1990's following accusations that anthropology had been tainted by its involvement with colonial administrators (Said 1979). The attempt to create a greater self-awareness and to be more neutral observers of society, has produced the following observation:

> the colonialism in anthropology has not simply come from white anthropologists studying nonwhite third World people. Rather, it has come from the rich, powerful and dominant studying the poor, powerless and subordinate; and racism has been more symptom and by-product than cause of this exploitation (Keesing 1981:491)

The aid industry has strong vested interests in hiding the fact that a lot of the time it is acting in a neocolonial way and getting things very wrong in southern Sudan. For an outside consultant to admit that they do not know enough about Sudan to assess the situation of child-soldiers after a two-week visit takes humility and courage, as it would probably mean that person would not get another job! Most of the time such people try instead to fabricate 'knowledge' and give it a false degree of academic credibility by using the current terms and techniques that give the aura that 'development' is genuinely progressing towards a greater knowledge of its 'subjects'[15]. In anthropological fieldwork, ironically, a greater depth of knowledge only opens up new vistas of areas one does not understand - and an ultimate conclusion that there are aspects of a society (so-called 'experience-near' concepts) that can only be understood by members of that society.

> After several months of fieldwork, a researcher learns the formal rules and groupings that lie on the surface of a society and its culture. At this stage one might feel a confidence and understanding that later evaporates into a feeling of ignorance as one penetrates to a deeper level... Those who have penetrated most deeply into another way of life are [more] often left with a feeling of how complex it is and how profound and unpredictable are the ramifications of any decision or event ... than with a feeling that everything is known, that predication is possible.... Too often the role of consultant has taken the anthropologist into an area just long enough for the formal outlines to come into focus, and not long enough for them to disappear into a blur again (Keesing 1981:487)

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[15]   c. f Odhiambo (1993:44-470): 'understanding people's culture requires some degree of humility on the part of the researchers, since they are required to confess ignorance about the subject of their research' and also ...'the current process is that researchers and development agents claim to be representatives of the people, on the arrogant assumption that their particular techniques are the exclusive domain of trained academics and elites'

I have the feeling that the events of 1998 would not have been allowed to be seen in such simplistic black-and-white terms if the victims had been westerners. Soldiers for example in World War Two Europe were seen as heroes not scroungers. Of course there is racism here - but it is a racism bred in aid workers after some years of work in the exploitative atmosphere of aid, rather than necessarily a racism they entered with. As such, one then has to ask to what extent does the mechanism of aid - with its 'foreign experts' and assumption of technical superiority - prevent aid workers from seeing local people as competent performers in their own lives and translate them into being simply recipients of charity[16].

To say that this kind of misrepresentation of other people is a natural part of human identity is not to say it is forgivable in an aid worker. It is just to say that one must be aware that it will always be present. A good anthropologist knows that 'where a person stands on an issue depends on where they sit'. And unless aid workers undertake a rigorous and constant process of understanding the position they occupy as representatives of a powerful block of countries that feel they have won the right to tell other countries what to do, they will never be able to see the perspective of those other people (compare for example Jok Madut's questioning of his identity as an aid worker and a Dinka and what biases that might introduce (Jok Madut Jok 1997: 53). Gathering knowledge is not about devising ever-more complex methods of getting around the lies of local people. It is about understanding that they have a perspective - but that that perspective will be hidden if one goes into a place carrying a very clear and powerful agenda.

When my fieldwork was commissioned in Sudan, the intention of the donor was to find out who was vulnerable in southern Sudanese society (it was called 'The Southern Sudan Vulnerability Study'), so that these people could

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[16] There will be a tendency by relief workers to 'foreground' any topic related to their work, while relegating to the background the real lives of local people - the marriages, the court cases, mythical tales or whatever.

be better targeted. However, by adopting an anthropological approach - to try to understand what equivalent there was to vulnerability in Dinka society and what it meant from a Dinka perspective - I realised that things were more complex than a simple 'logy' would allow. It was clear that there was a concept of vulnerability and a knowledge that some people were better off than others, but the idea that a resource such as food aid should be shared out unequally in a famine went against deep-seated convictions within the society and strongly-held principles about what relief food represented. 'Redistributions' of aid were thus conducted on a regular basis to share food with those who had not received at the distribution site. Of course there was corruption and taxation during the famine of 1998, but not to the extent portrayed by those wishing to paint the famine as having been caused by 'diversion' to the SPLA.

The fieldwork caused me to question regularly the prejudices and perceptions that the western world has of southern Sudan and constantly ask if these were getting in the way of an accurate portrayal of the situation. One theme that was constantly recurring from relief workers and the media was the idea that food-aid was feeding the warring parties - in effect the outside world was muscling in and claiming that it was causing the war. While the above description shows the inevitability of seeing another culture through ones own cultural spectacles - what struck me was the realisation that war and famine in Africa only matter to the West to the extent that we ask ourselves how we are involved in it and what we are doing about it. If there is a war, we believe that there must be a simple solution such as telling people to 'co-exist' and encouraging peace negotiations[17] or if there is a famine we should provide food; but if one should suggest that maybe there is a logical rationale for the war, and that supporting one side or the other

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[17]   War, it seems, is seen by most relief workers as a bothersome encumbrance to doing quality relief work rather than the principle reason why they are there - and hence they exaggerate the relative importance of aid and underestimate the destructive capacity of the war.

would bring an end to the suffering this is seen as overstepping the mark; similarly, if one suggests that people should be helped to build up their lives rather than being kept dangling over an abyss, one is accused of encouraging a dependency. In other words, solving the problem is not as important as *being seen* to solve the problem - and this is why the media and public relations matter. Genuinely 'solving the problem' might involve difficult moral choices and potential financial hardships, while bringing no greater a moral reward than feeling that the problem is being addressed (it would require a less lazy and patriotic press to reveal this hypocrisy).

'Knowledge' in this case means self-knowledge. If relief in south Sudan is to be improved, practitioners need to begin by seeing that the *hubris* of humanitarian relief, which contributed to the dispute in 2000 over the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, is preventing relief workers from realising that people know how to lead their own lives. It is also preventing them from seeing that relief is not helping to build up people's defenses against famine. Maybe it will only work when people are taking care of their own kith and kin. Perhaps in the end we do not care enough - after all Sudan is a very different, very foreign place that does not really have much impact on everyday lives in the West. If self-knowledge teaches us this, then it can give us an insight - that we need to *be forced to* confront our failure to care enough for Sudan, and not allow our lazy disinterest to blame things on the intransigence of locals so that we can feel principled about our foreign aid policies.

'It is when we try to grapple with another man's intimate need that we perceive how incomprehensible, wavering and misty are the beings which share with us the sight of the stars and the warmth of the sun' (Conrad 1900/1986:175)

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THE CURRENT STATE OF SCHOOL EDUCATION IN THE SUDAN

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The Sudan is a vast country - one million square miles - with a small population. Economic resources are meagre, and services in all fields are poor. It is difficult to trace the limits of quality in the area of education and more so to identify satisfactory criteria for measurement. However it can be said, generally that quality in education is the sum of interactions between inputs, processes and outputs.

Lack of financial and human resources has hindered development. What had been allotted for education in the country's budget did not cope with the aspirations and the optimistic plans. The failure to train qualified teachers to properly carry out the educational policy also played a part in this. Moreover language and cultural differences between North and South also contributed to this. Lack of integration between the two parts of the country helped in heightening the political struggle and thus the educational policy was adversely affected. The absence of stability since the independence of Sudan has had its effect on education. With the fall of governments and the appearance of new ones, policies are cancelled and new ones started and so things used to move in a vicious circle.

The General Education Act of 1992

This act was meant to cover and reform the whole system of education. It has been issued and put into force hurriedly, and it stressed the administrative side and concerned itself with the condition of school buildings and similar issues,

but ignored the academic side of the problem, the most important aspect of which is the training of teachers.

Teacher training

Previous to the educational reform of 1991 there were three modes of primary school teacher training.

1. Pre-Service training in institutes which offered four-year courses for junior secondary school graduates (there were nine for men and eight for women).

2. In-Service training in 'In-service Educational Training Institutes' (ISETIs) which offered two year on-the-job training courses for untrained secondary school graduates with at least one year teaching experience in primary schools, using the integrated multimedia approach applied by the UNRWA-UNESCO Institute for training refugee teachers in Palestine.

3. The third form, known as Successive Training, offered two successive three-month courses for untrained secondary school graduates teaching in primary school during the summer vacation.

The training capacity of the three forms was some 3,000 teachers per year, which was considered adequate for normal expansion.

Junior secondary school teachers were trained in 8 institutes, which offered two-year training courses for senior secondary school leavers. Senior secondary school teachers were drawn mainly from three sources:

(a) university graduates from faculties of education, who were fully qualified and present no problem;

(b) university graduates from other faculties who, though academically qualified, lacked teacher training qualification;

(c) non-graduates were those who have had some years of university education but lack academic and teacher training qualifications.

The reform policy raised the minimum qualification of teachers from a secondary school certificate to a university degree. Consequently all the former institutes have been converted to university college level to provide in-service degree courses for ex-primary and junior schoolteachers as well as training new teachers.

The main reasons for raising the qualification of schoolteachers were

a) to enable them to cope with the changes in the goals, the content and methods of education;

b) to give specialised training, for example for class teachers, multigrade teachers, or special education teachers;

c) to help teachers develop academically and professionally so as to participate in the development of education in the country.

However the implementation of the new policy was hampered by many constraints.

- Shortages of teachers discouraged many state educational authorities from releasing large numbers of teachers for long training periods.

- Difficulty of co-ordination between centre and states in financing, planning and implementing training programmes.

- Often a shortage of financial resources has prevented some states from bearing the training costs.

- Many teachers have family obligations and prefer to stay near or with their families and resist any movement, which may disturb their family life. This has resulted in a comparatively high rate of dropout from the training courses.

The Comprehensive National Strategy for Development (1992-2002) set the year 2000 as the target date for Universal Primary Education by which the total number of basic education teachers should rise to an estimated number of 140,000 teachers, entailing the training of 45,000 new teachers in six years (1994/95-2000/1), an average of 7500 teachers per year.

Table 1: Number of teachers in Government secondary schools, 1994-95

State	Male		Female		Both sexes		Total
	Untrained	Trained	Untrained	Trained	Untrained	Trained	
Northern	32	241	88	87	120	328	448
River Nile	75	244	142	227	217	471	688
Khartoum	678	678	761	508	1,439	1,186	2,625
El Gezira	486	366	362	768	848	1,134	1,982
Blue Nile	61	21	34	15	95	36	131
Sinar	195	123	97	79	292	202	494
Wh. Nile	323	100	268	55	591	155	746
N. K'fan	111	102	116	59	227	161	388
S. K'fan	150	31	48	21	198	52	250
W. K'fan	57	101	34	33	91	134	225
N. Darfur	63	189	112	51	175	240	415
S. Darfur	188	84	57	18	245	102	347
W. Darfur	108	57	10	10	118	67	185
Red Sea	27	74	97	129	124	203	327
Kasala	92	138	68	81	160	219	379
El Gedarif	25	210	20	48	45	258	303
Warab	80	87	87	48	167	135	302
B. el Gh.	31	58	4	3	35	61	96
U. Nile	16	19	2	2	18	21	39
TOTAL	2,741	2,893	2,342	2,347	5,088	5,135	10,223

As tables 1 and 2, show, if we add 41,000 untrained serving teachers, a total of 86,000 needed to be trained during the period, an undertaking for which the existing training facilities and programmes were decidedly inadequate.

Table 2: No. of teachers in Government foundation schools, 1994/95

State	Male		Female		Both sexes		Total
	Untrained	Trained	Untrained	Trained	Untrained	Trained	
Northern	266	2,050	1,235	1,935	1,501	3,985	5,486
River Nile	444	2,621	1,235	1,935	2,159	5,735	7,894
Khartoum	2,477	1,239	8,833	2,945	11,310	4,184	15,494
El Gezira	3,250	4,306	4,978	3,757	8,228	8,063	16,291
Blue Nile	161	331	520	281	681	612	1,293
Sinar	662	1,242	1,198	1,342	1,860	2,584	4,444
Wh. Nile	655	1,573	2,480	1,981	3,135	3,554	6,689
N. K'fan	378	1,157	1,616	2,268	1,994	3,425	5,419
S. K'fan	509	733	186	1,904	695	2,637	3,332
W. K'fan	312	988	437	1,548	749	2,536	3,285
N. Darfur	865	1,255	1,346	1,525	2,211	2,780	4,991
S. Darfur	321	2,179	648	1,895	969	4,074	5,043
W. Darfur	362	378	491	267	853	645	1,498
Red Sea	164	512	342	558	506	1,070	1,576
Kasala	541	974	992	1,407	1,533	2,381	3,914
El Gedarif	551	1,199	818	923	1,369	2,122	3,491
Warab	410	630	212	317	621	947	1,568
B. el Gh.	203	467	112	155	315	622	937
U. Nile	239	429	129	170	368	599	967
W. BeG.	79	299	41	166	120	465	585
W. Equa.	74	91	29	23	103	114	217
TOTAL	12,923	24,753	28,357	28,381	41,280	53,134	94,414

Also some 50% of the secondary education staff were untrained, and there was a shortage of specialized subject teachers, particularly mathematics, science and language teachers. The problem was expected to worsen when the proposed multi-purpose secondary schools replaced the present academic secondary schools, a change planned for July 2000.

Table 3 shows changes in the number of schools, pupils and teachers in government foundation and secondary education in 1995/6 and 1998/9.

Table 3: Government foundation and secondary education, 1995/96 - 1998/99

		1995/96	1998/99	Percentage change
Foundation level	No. of schools	10,713	11,982	+11%
	No. of pupils	2,963,388	3,511,718	+16%
	No. of teachers	95,262	103,820	+8%
Secondary level	No. of schools	1,206	1,517	+21%
	No. of pupils	363,699	485,610	+25%
	No. of teachers	11,661	17,073	+32%

On Thursday 16th July 2000, in a speech to Omdurman Radio, the Minister of Education spoke about new curricula and about textbooks. He announced the intention of acting on the President's declaration concerning free education for everybody, together with availability of free textbooks. He said curricula in the foundation level are so settled that results in the final examinations were excellent, which encouraged a plan to renew the curricula for the secondary level. For the first year secondary level curricular and aims had been prepared, and the textbooks for the first year were printed.

However, instead of giving the textbooks free to the learners, school authorities compelled the learners to pay money indirectly, through charges for maintenance of class rooms and furniture; maintenance of school buildings; and donations. In practice, according to *Al-Ayam* of 22nd July 2000, the presidential decree has not been implemented.

On 26th June 2000 in Friendship Hall in Khartoum, the Ministers of Education of all the Sudanese states held a conference to discuss their worries and seek solutions for them. They concluded that education in their states is facing a lot of difficulties, notably lack of financing, lack of textbooks, pupils deserting schools, and entry to foundation level with low standards, so that students failed when moved to the higher levels. The Minister of Education for Red Sea State stated that schools in the state are scattered, with around 50% in nomad areas, and that 171 teachers are missing at secondary level; and complained that they don't receive any financing for adult education. All the ministers expressed their worries, but they did not suggest any solutions.

The new textbook for 1st year secondary level is complete but has not been tested, and teachers have not been trained how to use it.

Solutions

Education is a national concern. Every competent body should participate in making the curricula, not only those who are loyal to the political authority no matter whatever their age or experience. The solution lies in the rule of democracy, real democracy when the right person is put in the right place.

Patrol No. 32:
BRITISH COLONIAL VIOLENCE IN THE NUBA MOUNTAINS
By Justin Willis

In 1917, a large punitive mission was despatched against the Nyima hills, in the north of the Nuba mountains. Such 'patrols' were by no means unusual in the Nuba hills; between 1900 and 1926, more than twenty were reported. The 1917 patrol was a little larger than usual - around 3,000 regular soldiers were involved, including artillery and machine-gun units. But what really makes it different is that we have a considerable photographic, as well as written, record of the event. This paper uses that record to examine this event; to understand what drove this kind of violent assault, and to understand too what effects it had on Nuba society. British officers treated these events as boyish adventures, but for African societies their effects were extraordinarily disruptive.

The making of colonial violence

From their first contact with the inhabitants of the Nyima hills, British administrators were unhappy at what they saw as the propensity of these people - and the populace of other Nuba hills - to raid one another and neighbouring cattle pastoralists.[18] This was a direct challenge to the government's claim to a monopoly of legitimate violence; such defiance was a threat to the prestige of government which could not be tolerated. They believed that the fault generally lay with the rulers of communities living in the Nuba hills, who either instigated raids themselves or failed to restrain

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[18] Kordofan Province Annual Reports, 1904 and 1905, Sudan Archive Durham (SAD) 701/25/159-69.

others from doing so. In the first two decades of British rule, there was particular suspicion of the role of ritual specialists, who were viewed as a dangerous priestly caste, antipathetic to external authority and liable to undermine those chiefs, or *mek*s, who were inclined to prevent raids.[19] The British called such figures *kujur*s everywhere in the hills, although by no means all the disparate communities of the Nuba hills would have used this term. In 1917, British displeasure was focussed on the populace of the Nyima hills, and their ruler Agabna (whose name also appears as Agemna). Agabna had failed to prevent, or pay compensation for, a series of raids; he had also shown himself increasingly reluctant to pay the tribute which was required of every recognized ruler as evidence of their submission to the authority of the Condominium. This build-up of tension followed a well-established pattern. It is apparent that the British found Nuba raiding so offensive partly because of the way that they construed nineteenth-century Nuba history, as a period in which the peoples of the Nuba hills had been constantly at bay, harried by Arab slavers. The disorder, cruelty and incessant slave-raiding of that period were key elements in British legitimations of Condominium authority: in British eyes 'the Nuba' were victims, who had been saved from further torment by the advent of the Condominum - yet who (as was all too often the case) failed to respond appropriately to this turn of events, and had instead become 'arrogant'.[20] The people of the Nuba hills were that most irritating of colonial phenomena, ungrateful subjects.

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[19] Lloyd, 'Draft report on the Kordofan province, 1908', SAD 283/9/40-68.

[20] J. W. Sagar, 'Notes on the history, religion and customs of the Nubas', *Sudan Notes and Records*, 5 (1922), 137-56.

Well-established too was another motivating factor in the raid: the desire of British officers in the army, and administrators, to see military action. For some years this had been an acknowledged issue: a punitive mission planned in 1910 against another part of the Mountains was swamped with volunteers.[21] In 1917 this factor was if anything more acute. Army officers (and some administrators) in Sudan were deeply uncomfortable at their position, fired by frustrated desire for action and, evidently, a sense of guilt that they were so distant from the appalling slaughter of the Western Front, and the opportunity for active service was eagerly sought.[22] So too was the opportunity to try out the rapidly evolving weapons and techniques of modern warfare. The official report of the patrol dwelt on the relative virtues of different kinds of artillery round; and the officer in charge was careful to capture on film the neat little machine-gun emplacements and barbed wire entanglements which his men constructed to deny the people of Nyima access to water holes.[23] For British officers, this raid offered the chance to play at soldiers and the opportunity (with limited personal risk) to expiate some of their guilt at missing the fate that was overtaking so many of their generation and class.

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[21] Asser to Wingate, 12 Oct. 1910, SAD 298/1/35-39.

[22] Wingate to Drake, 11 Aug. 1915, SAD 196/2/93; Wingate to Cromer, 21 June 1915, SAD 195/4/197-98.

[23] There are technical discussions of the efficacy of various new techniques in L. Smith, 'Report on Patrol No. 32, SAD 643/13/1-42; see also Sudan Intelligence Report No. 282 Jan. 1918, Public Record Office FO 371/3199.

The 'friendlies'

Other factors too drove the raid; most notably, the complex relationship between the British (and Egyptian) administrators of the Condominium and the chiefs and influential men through whom they sought to exercise authority - those whom officials sought to turn from allies into agents (as Lonsdale has said of Kenya). For the 3,000 soldiers were not alone. They were supported by a levy of Baggara Arab horsemen, long in an ambivalent relationship with the people of Nyima, on whom they might rely for grain, from whom they might obtain slaves for trading - but to whose raids they were occasionally subject.[24] The Baggara perceived that British rule had favoured the hill people against cattle nomads like themselves; ending the slave trade and punishing Arab raids on the hills, but apparently unable to stop hill people from stealing their cattle. They were ready to encourage British action, and ready to supplement British forces and - as British officers later acknowledged - were ready to exploit any opportunity for 'picking up a stray cow or a Nuba' in the wake of a raid.[25]

In later years British officials could categorize this Baggara involvement as part of a general pattern of Arab oppression (retrospectively excusing their own behaviour as the consequence of Arab manipulation).[26] But the chiefs, or *mek*s, of neighbouring hills - other 'Nuba' - were equally willing to encourage and exploit punitive raids, and one of them supplied seventy armed men for the punitive force, who were to play a crucial role. They too

[24] Vicars-Miles, 'Notes on Nuba Administration', 11, SAD 631/10/1-64.

[25] Vicars-Miles, 'Notes on Nuba Administration', 11, SAD 631/10/1-64..

[26] J. Gillan, *Some Aspects of Nuba Administration* (Khartoum, 1931), 48.

saw such raids as the chance for themselves - and their followers - to pick up a little loot in authorised raiding. In 1910, one British administrator engaged in a punitive raid in the Nuba hills casually noted that he spent an afternoon with the 'friendlies', 'watching them doing a little looting';[27] and the photographic record of Patrol No. 32 reveals a similarly relaxed attitude to this kind of behaviour.[28]

An outline of events

Agabna had ceased to pay tribute by 1915, and the number of thefts blamed on his people had grown steadily. In consequence, the people of Nyima were by the beginning of 1917 subject to the kind of limited punitive measures which were commonplace; essentially an attempt at intimidation by a company-level force. In April 1917 this force made a botched raid on Agabna's own village; as they retreated, in some confusion, the district administrator, Hutton, was shot dead.[29] The death of this officer led to an immediate decision for a large-scale punitive mission, but for the next five months of the rainy season there was only limited activity: a slightly reinforced body of soldiers made a series of minor raids, burning houses indiscriminately and seizing livestock.[30] By October 1917, a much larger force had been assembled, ready for a much more methodical exercise in violence.

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[27] Diary, Savile, 4 Feb. 1910, SAD 427/7/1-150

[28] SAD.A71/81.

[29] Smith, 'Report on Patrol No. 32', 2, SAD 643/13/1-42.

[30] Smith, 'Report on Patrol No. 32', 3-4, SAD 643/13/1-42.

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Leonard Smith, the commander of Patrol No. 32 was reluctant to risk direct assaults on the rocky hills of Nyima, which offered many natural hiding places and fastnesses for a populace who had ample stocks of firearms. The intention was to encircle the hills with fortified positions and so to force the surrender of the populace through hunger and thirst. The patrol followed this policy through; using artillery against the hills to prevent riflemen from sniping, and then drawing steadily closer in to the hills. When it seemed that there was no further resistance from a hill, it was stormed.[31] Captured houses and grain stores were destroyed; captured livestock were impounded to pay for 'fines' or to pay compensation to those who claimed to have been raided by Nyima people. However, only some people were *allowed* to surrender. Only young men, with guns, were accepted as prisoners. Older men, women and children, or even young men without guns who attempted to give themselves up were 'turned adrift', sometimes hundreds at a time; either to return and starve in the hills, or to seek refuge with the people on other Nuba hills, or with the Baggara - refuge which would in either case have involved the acceptance of a servile and marginal position.[32]

This policy was the centrepiece of the assault on Nyima society, and it was maintained even after the capture of Agabna at the end of December. Agabna, together with a *kujur* of Nyima, was captured by the *mek* of a neighbouring hill and his 'friendlies' who persuaded either them - or more likely, their remaining followers - that further resistance was futile. The two men were 'tried' and publicly hanged within a day of capture; no record

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[31] Smith, 'Report on Patrol No. 32', 6, SAD 643/13/1-42.

[32] 'Report on Patrol No. 32', 10, and 'Plan of operations', SAD 643/13/1-42.

survives of the trial or of the precise charges which they faced.[33] A later account revealed that their heads were cut off and displayed in public - a detail suppressed in reports at the time.[34] But the capture of Agabna was only one aim of the patrol; the stated objectives demanded 'the seizure of all arms, ammunition, cattle etc and the destruction of enemy crops' and 'the capture of all young men'.[35] The patrol continued until late February, at which point Smith deemed that a sufficient number of young men had surrendered with rifles and enough destruction had been done and the patrol was called off. Nimr, the neighouring *mek* who had helped the British was rewarded with a 'robe of honour' and a hundred pounds, and was recognized by the British as the new 'ruler' of the hill. Then the soldiers marched away, apparently taking with them dozens of young male captives who were forcibly conscripted into the army. Overall, 4,000 individuals had been captured, as well as 1,132 cattle and uncounted sheep and goats.[36]

The consequences of violence

The cost of all this to the populace of Nyima was clear enough, in one sense: a cost which might be quantified in terms of dead, wounded and abducted; of livestock lost and grain destroyed.[37] And while Patrol No. 32 was unusual in its scale, the deliberate destruction of all items of value was characteristic of

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[33] Smith, 'Report on Patrol No. 32', 14-15, SAD 643/13/1-42.

[34] Extract from Lamb, 'Operations against the Nuba Gebels' (published in the *Cavalry Journal*, 1935: SAD 795/8/183-87.

[35] Operational Order No. 1, appended to Smith, 'Report on Patrol No. 32', SAD 643/13/1-42.

[36] Smith, 'Report on Patrol No. 32', 19, SAD 643/13/1-42.

[37] Although the report was curiously reticent on the issue of casualties to the Nyima population, estimating 500 killed by the end of January but giving no final totals for killed or wounded: Smith, Report on Patrol No. 32', 17, SAD 643/13/1-42...

these patrols: 'Finding no opposition, we only burned the houses and grain and killed all the animals', wrote Savile of one minor operation in 1910.[38] There was however a further cost: events such as Patrol No. 32 contributed to the remaking of ideas of authority and moral behaviour in Nyima, and across Nuba, by changing the terms of chronic conflicts within Nuba society that ran along the lines of age and gender. To understand how this happened, we must try and piece together - from fragmentary evidence, which includes the records of Patrol No. 32 itself - the changing nature of authority in societies in the Nuba hills in the early twentieth century.

Agabna and the Kujur

The British approach to governing the communities of the Nuba hills was based around the idea that there must be a source of authority in each community. In some cases, there might be two such sources, one religious and one political, with a clear divide, and a degree of competition, between the two forms. But British conceptions of authority did not go beyond this bipolarity. Every community must have a chief; the chief might be the same as the priest, or might compete with the priest; but there must be a chief.[39] And, by extension, if members of a community refused to pay tribute, or raided their neighbours, this must be the work of the chief - or of a priest challenging the chief's rule. Seligman, observing Nuba societies in 1910 - and no doubt influenced by the British officers with whom he dined - had

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[38] Diary, Savile, 1 Feb. 1910, SAD 427/7/1-150.

[39] Sagar, 'Notes on the history, religion and customs of the Nubas'.

argued that 'real' power lay in the hands of ritual specialists and that chiefs were subordinate.[40]

Yet there is little evidence for such centralisation of authority in most of the communities of the Nuba hills; nor is it clear that local discourse distinguished chiefly authority and priestly authority in any systematic way; even Seligman's own account suggested that those with whom he dealt claimed both ritual and political roles.[41] Where central authority had existed among the societies of the Nuba hills in the nineteenth century, it had generally been associated with the exercise of violence and with the mediation of relationships with the world beyond the hills. Individual big men - some of whom claimed particular prophetic powers which were of particular significance in the planning of raids - acquired followings of young men, who sought through service the means to accumulate wealth for marriage. In some of the hills, this relationship between individual/prophetic power and the organized energies of young men had come to be formalized through an age-grade system: young men worked as a group on the fields of prophets, or they served as raiders, with the raids yielding livestock that could be used to start their own trajectory of acquisition as male household heads, or yielding captives who might be ransomed or sold as slaves, bringing in livestock or weapons. Leadership was associated with organizing young men in productive or destructive pursuits, and with using the product of such organization to trade with others. In the later nineteenth century, the importance of these organizers of violence had been enhanced by

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[40] C. Seligman, *Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan*, London, 1932, 375-78 and; for his social contacts with officials, see Diary, Savile, 28 Jan. 1910, SAD 427/7/1-150.

[41] Seligman, *Pagan Tribes*, 399-400; see also his discussion of 'departmental experts' on 395-398

circumstances, as they were able to supply grain and slaves - each the product of young men's labour - to Arabs in return for firearms, which became items of bridewealth as well as tools of coercion.[42]

Nadel, observing the people of the Nuba hills in the late 1930s (after several decades of British efforts to generate a central authority) was struck by the historical transience of such authority, and stressed that in most of the hills the attempts of local big men to build up authority were based on varying combinations of wealth, reputation, and involvement with particular places or practices which were believed to ensure general well-being.[43] Through dextrous deployment of these resources, men might attract a following of young men, drawing as they did so on the chronic tension between young men and old over the distribution of wealth and access to women: there was always a ready supply of young men who thought their fathers and uncles were too slow in supplying the means for them to marry, and were willing to serve as cultivators and raiders for big men, in return for help with bridewealth. There was no single authority, nor even a bipolarity, in most communities in the Nuba hills. Agabna himself, cast as hereditary chief in British terms, was a member of a rain-making lineage, whose recent ancestors had parlayed this ritual role into a degree of authority over a growing following, and who had then used this position to secure recognition by the British as local chiefs.[44] But their authority was not simply accepted by the people of the Nyima hills. Nor was that of the *kujur* Kilkun, Agabna's

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[42] Intelligence Department, *Kordofan and the Region to the West of the White Nile*, (Khartoum, 1912), 93.

[43] S. Nadel, *The Nuba. An Anthropological Study of the Hill Tribes of Kordofan*

(London, 1947), 162-67, 259-62, 309-310, 447-53.

[44] Nadel, *The Nuba*, 452-53; Lloyd, 'Notes on Jebel Nyima', SAD 701/25/235-39.

ally -who was seen by the British as the key to his support - yet whose own position was contested.[45] A statement recorded from Kilkun in 1908, discussing the organisation of a raid, showed how he and others, including Agabna, all competed to organize young men into raiding bands which would yield loot.[46] Agabna was not a despot in occasional conflict with a turbulent priesthood; he was one of many contenders for authority over young men, whose labour as raiders and farmers was central to accumulation.

Rebellious chiefs?

The contingent and contested nature of Agabna's authority helps to explain the tense relationship which he - and other chiefs of Nuba communities - had with the British in the years up to the mid-1920s. The British recognized these men as chiefs because their wealth made them influential, and because authority over young men gave them a degree of coercive power which the British desired to harness; and they themselves hoped to derive further authority form association with the erratic but unstoppable power of the government, just as some had benefited from alliance with the *nazir*s of particular nomad groups in the nineteenth century. Yet they found the engagement an unrewarding one. They were expected to collect tribute for payment to the government: should they fail in this task they themselves were first exposed to violent expropriation during one of the infrequent passages of British administrators. The sole support they received in return for this was the assurance that government would approve any consequent

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[45] Sagar, 'Notes on the history, religion and customs of the Nubas'.

[46] 'Statement of kujur Kilkun, 18 Nov. 1908, SAD 701/25/303-4.

depredations they might make on the wealth of their 'subjects'.[47] On the other hand, they were supposed to prevent young men from raiding other communities, so that a principle source of livestock was now denied to these men. Effectively restricted to raiding their own subjects, Agabna and others found themselves in an increasingly difficult position, for they were unable to acquire resources needed to reward young men; and they were in an increasingly hostile relationship with male heads of families, who were now the sole legitimate targets of their violence. In such circumstances it was not hard for them to find themselves 'in practical revolt', as Wingate put it[48] - perhaps simply because they lacked the authority which government assumed them to possess.

Meanwhile, young men were tempted by other patrons; either aspirant big men who defied the restrictions on raiding; or - increasingly - government itself, which employed numbers of men from the Nuba hills as police or soldiers. In 1914, the 'revolt' of Fiki Ali, chief of Miri, which caused great anxiety, was apparently prompted not so much by the subversive preachings of pro-Ottoman gun-runners (as the British believed)[49] as by his concern that the government was tempting away all his followers to serve in the Nuba Territorial Company.[50] Chiefs of Nuba communities faced new demands from the state even as the basis of their authority was being undermined by the state.

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[47] Savile, Diary, 9 Feb. 1910, SAD 427/7/1-150.

[48] Wingate to Kitchener, 19 Feb. 1914, SAD 157/2/35-38.

[49] Balfour to ?, 21 July 1915, SAD 303/8/1.

[50] Balfour to Wingate, 20 Aug. 1915, SAD 196/2/199-200; Drake to Wingate, nd May 1915, SAD 195/2/123-127.

The consequence of raids such as Patrol No. 32 was to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, this crisis of authority in the communities of the Nuba hills. These events did undermine the authority of household heads, with whom aspirant chiefs were in competition, for the destructive effect of raids fell most heavily on those who possessed capital - houses, granaries, and livestock, as well as women and children.[51] When homes were destroyed, grain burned and cattle stolen it became ever more difficult for fathers to provide bridewealth for their sons, for they had no means to do so. But this weakening of the household brought no benefit to the *mek*s, for societies which were the target of such raids anyway found the competition for young male followers more acute, as young men were killed, or wounded, or conscripted into the army. In societies such as Nyima, migration elsewhere must have been the major aim of young men for some years after the raid.[52] Patrols broke down patterns of wealth and accumulation; encouraging an idea of authority which was based on coercion and violence yet diminishing the ability of chiefs to command young men, who were the central coercive resource.

Conclusion

The violence of the 'Patrol' did bring brief rewards to some. Participation briefly boosted the authority of those chiefs, like Nimr, who provided 'friendlies'. But once the soldiers marched away, Nimr was left facing the

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[51] Balfour to Mother, 15 May 1915, SAD 303/8/5.

[52] As was noted in the aftermath of the Fiki Ali 'revolt': Balfour to Wingate, 20 Aug. 1915, SAD 196/2/199-200.

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same contradictory demands which had propelled Agabna to 'rebellion'. British policy encouraged an authority based on coercion, and demanded that chiefs predate on their own subjects - only thus could they pay tribute and attract followers. But the government offered no routine support for this coercion, and those chiefs who failed to impose their authority were cast as rebels, liable to wholesale assault. Up to the mid-1920s, British policy towards the people of the Nuba hills locked these communities into a spiral of violence, in which authority came to be ever more closely identified with coercion. Only in the mid-1920s did the frequency of punitive patrols begin to diminish, when British policy shifted and officials began systematically to incorporate *mek*s into the coercive structure of the state - as part of the formalization of indirect rule, which by the end of the 1920s assumed a particularly extravagant rhetorical form in the Nuba mountains, where the British claimed that they were promoting a 'Nuba renaissance'.[53] In later years British officials liked to believe that the years of patrols had been a necessary prelude to effective administration, instilling the people of the Nuba hills with a respect for government.[54] Yet it was the introduction of courts and armed chiefs' police which was the turning point; within a few years of these innovations, patrols had almost entirely ceased.[55] The legacy of the period remained, however; the patrols had confirmed that organized violence was the key to authority. So it was that the archetypal chief of the Nuba hills was, by 1940, not the traditional' ruler or the *kujur* - but rather the ex-NCO.[56]

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[53] 'Devolution in Native Administration, Nuba Mountains Province', 8 Mar. 1927, 723/6/15-22; Gillan, *Some Aspects of Nuba Administration*, 56.

[54] Gillan, *Some Aspects of Nuba Administration*, 13.

[55] Vicars-Miles, 'Notes on Nuba Administration', 1.

[56] Owen, 'A Visit to the Nuba Mountains', 76, SAD 769/11/1-19.

NOTES AND NEWS

Recent publications on the Sudan notified to the University of Durham. Compiled with the help of John Lumsden and Jane Hogan:

Archaeology
Nicoll, K.
'Radiocarbon Chronologies for Prehistoric Human Occupation and Hydroclimatic Change in Egypt and Northern Sudan'
Geoarchaeology, 2001, Vol. 16, pp. 47-64

Welsby, D.A.
Life on the Desert Edge. Seven thousand years of settlement in the Northern Dongola Reach, Sudan
London: BAR International Series, 2001

Geography
Ahmed, N.E.; Kanan, H.O.; Inanaga, S.; Ma, Y.Q.; Sugimoto, Y.
'Impact of pesticide seed treatments on aphid control and yield of wheat in the Sudan'
Crop Protection, 2001, Vol. 20, pp. 929-934

ElAmin, F.A.; Diab, I.E.; Ibrahim, S.I.
'Influence of Eucalyptus Cover on Some Physical and Chemical Properties of a Soil in Sudan'
Communications in Soil Science and Plant Analysis, 2001, Vol. 32, pp. 2267-2278

Elias, E.A.; Salih, A.A.; Alaily, F.
'Cracking patterns in the vertisols of the Sudan Gezira'
International Agrophysics, 2001 Vol. 15, pp. 151-56

Guvele, C. A.
'Gains from crop diversification in the Sudan Gezira scheme'
Agricultural Systems, 2001, Vol. 70, pp. 319-333

Hammad, E.A.; Dawelbeit, M.I.
'Effect of tillage and field condition on soil physical properties, cane and sugar yields in vertisols of Kenana Sugar Estate, Sudan'
Soil and Tillage Research, 2001. Vol. 62, pp. 101-109

Kirkby, J.
'Saving the Gash Delta, Sudan'
Land Degradation and Development, 2001, Vol. 12, pp. 225-236

Osman, Y. Z.; Shamseldin, A.Y.; Abdo, G.M.
'El Nino: southern oscillation and rainfall variability in central and southern Sudan'

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Water International, 2001, Vol. 26, pp. 177-84

Alredaisy, S. M. A. H.; Davies, H. R. J.
'Vulnerability to famine in the Sub-Saharan Rainlands: Umm Sial village in White Nile State, Sudan'
Swansea Geographer, 2001, Vol. 36, pp. 75-83

Reenberg, A.
'Agricultural land use pattern dynamics in the Sudan-Sahel: towards an event-driven framework'
Land Use Policy, 2001, Vol. 18, pp. 309-319

Saeed Mosmar Alawad, S.
'Multi-temporal remotely served data cartography for sustainable natural resources management practices: Gedaref Region, Eastern Sudan',
International Archives of Photogrammetry and Remote Sensing, 2000, Vol. 33, pp. 1294-1300

Geology
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'Probabilistic seismic hazard assessment of Sudan and its vicinity'
Earthquake Spectra, 2001, Vol. 17, pp. 399-416

Mohamed, A.Y.; Ashcroft, W.A.; Whiteman, A.J.
'Structural development and crustal stretching in the Muglad Basin'
Journal of African Earth Sciences, 2001, Vol. 32, pp.179-92

History
Ibrahim, H. A.
'The strategy, responses and legacy of the first imperialist era in the Sudan, 1820-1885'
Muslim World, 2001, Vol. 91, pp. 209-228

Medicine/health
Charlwood, J.D.; Qassim, M.; Elnsur, E.I.; Donnelly, M.; *et al.*
'The impact of indoor residual spraying with malathion on malaria in refugee camps in eastern Sudan'
Acta Tropica, 2001, 80, pp. 1-8

ElHassan, A.M.; Khalil, E.A.G.
'Post-kala-azar dermal leishmaniasis: does it play a role in the transmission of Leishmania donovani in the Sudan?'
Tropical Medicine and International Health, 2001, Vol. 6, pp. 743-744

Hashim, M. S. K.
'Primary child health care programmes in Sudan: achievement, some challenges, more recent achievements and future challenges'
Revue Medicale Libanaise, 2001, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 23-26

Joja, L.L.; Okoli, U.A.

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'Trapping the vector: community action to curb sleeping sickness in southern Sudan'
American Journal of Public Health, 2001, Vol. 91, pp. 1583-1585

Omer, R.E.; VantVeer, P.; Kadaru, A.M.Y.; Kampman, E.; ElKhidir, I.M.; Fedail, S.S.; Kok, F.J.
'The role of hepatitis B and hepatitis C viral infections in the incidence of hepatocellular carcinoma in Sudan'
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 2001, Vol. 95, pp. 487-90

Eltom, A.; Eltom, M.; Idris, M.; Gebre Medhin, M.
'Thyroid function in the newborn in relation to maternal thyroid status during labour in a mild iodine deficiency endemic area in Sudan'
Clinical Endocrinology, 2001, Vol. 55, pp. 485-90

Politics
De Waal, A.
'Creating devastation and calling it Islam: The war for the Nuba, Sudan'
Sais Review, 2001, Vol, 21, pp. 117-22

Veterinary
Catley, A.; Okoth, S.; Osman, J.; Fison, T.; Njiru, Z.; Mwangi, J.; Jones, B.A.; Leyland, T.J.
'Participatory diagnosis of a chronic wasting disease in cattle in southern Sudan'
Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 2001, Vol. 51, pp. 161-81

CURRENT RESEARCH PROJECTS AND CONTACTS

This information is listed to promote research interchange amongst Sudanists; those with information or interests in the research area are encouraged to contact the researchers.

If you are involved in, or know of, ongoing research on Sudan which you would like mentioned here, please contact the Editor.

Simon Mollan, a doctoral student at the Department of History, University of Durham, is beginning research on the Sudan Plantation Syndicate. He is particularly interested in the place of the Syndicate in international networks of finance and investment, and would like to locate any collections of papers relating to the Syndicate, and to talk with individuals who were involved in it. He may be contacted by post at the Department of History, 43, North Bailey, Durham DH1 3 EX; or by e-mail at s.m.mollan@durham.ac.uk

Professor Ali Osman, David Edwards, Herman Bell and others are involved in a major project which combines archaeology, historical linguistics and oral history. They have kindly supplied this report on the work:

Language, Settlement and Long-Term History in Middle Nubia

Starting in late 1999 this project is trying to break new ground in combining archaeological, historical, linguistic and folkloric research within a regional study. It is hoped that the experience gained in this project will provide a basis for similar work in other regions in the future. Under the overall direction of Professor Ali Osman, the project now involves younger researchers from several Sudanese Universities, including University of Khartoum, Nile Valley University - Atbara and Shendi University as well as the Sudan National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums.

The primary focus is on the Mahas Nubian area of the Nile's Third Cataract, a region already recognised as having enjoyed a considerable significance as a cultural (including linguistic) frontier since the early medieval period, if not before. Relatively isolated and thinly populated, this region is interesting in preserving many elements of a historic settlement landscape, while forming the heartland of what is commonly seen as 'traditional' forms of Nubian culture in an environment where Nobíin speaking is still strong. The project also has an important 'rescue' element, both in response to the general pressures of modern development and the threatened construction of a new dam/barrage at Kajbar on the Third Cataract which would destroy much of the region.

Archaeological survey has now identified well over 300 sites over some 80 km of the river, in an area which was previously largely unknown. Late prehistoric settlement are common with several substantial late Neolithic and many Kerma (2500-1500BC) sites. Most work has concentrated on the riverine zone but some work along wadi systems to the east of the Nile have also found much evidence for late prehistoric occupation, at least into the mid-2nd millennium BC, by which time this area was becoming very arid. Some extensive systems of wadi walls may be the remains of ancient water-management systems.

However, the bulk of the sites are of medieval or later date, and it seems likely that the familiar patterns of riverine agricultural settlement were only really appearing during the first millennium AD. Many oral traditions on the associations of sites were recorded, providing fascinating detail on the history of these sites, as well as interesting insights into modern perceptions of 'ancient sites'. Studies of the postmedieval/'Islamic' period are being particularly productive with many well-preserved sites and a substantial body of oral traditions associated with them. This look very promising in terms of beginning to flesh out the otherwise obscure postmedieval history of this region, situated on the frontier between the central Sudanese kingdoms and the Ottoman Empire. Other traditions and genealogies are providing interesting insights into the penetration of Islam into the region, the impact of the Turkiyya of the nineteenth century and local histories of the Mahdiyya.

Linguistic work combined with a systematic study of place-names and their historical dimensions is well-advanced. The tonal system of the Mahas dialect of the Nobíin Nubian language was observed to be different from the previously published tone system based on dialects further to the north and a new test frame had to be devised to reveal the tones of Mahas place-names accurately, which are being transcribed in three ways; (1) phonetic symbols, (2) a system of Arabic-based characters and (3) a system of Old Nubian characters.

Core funding has been provided by the Haycock of Fund of the British Institute in Eastern Africa and University of Khartoum with much additional support coming from local communities in the study region.

Reports on the project may be found on: **http://www.oldnubia.com**

David N Edwards   Herman Bell

KHARTOUM PERSPECTIVES. A COLLECTION OF LECTURES GIVEN AT THE SUDAN CULTURAL CENTRE KHARTOUM IN THE 1940s AND 1950s.

Edited by Donald Hawley.

It is a rare review of a volume of lectures or essays by many authors that does not refer to "unevenness". That deficiency is often overcome by the significance of a unifying thematic thread or the multiple perspectives the authors represent. *Khartoum Perspectives* may be unique in that what holds it together is largely implied. Its thirty-six lectures by twenty-five authors are of interest now – some fifty years after the last one was delivered – less for their substance than for what they tell us of the intellectual aspirations and cultural milieu of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan's capital during the decade and a half before independence.

The very idea of a Sudan Cultural Centre was precipitated in the troubled atmosphere of the late 1930s by British officials' realisation of the need for a renewed approach to the shunned and belittled Sudanese educated class. This idea was brought to fruition by the civil secretary, Douglas Newbold, in 1940. It is doubtful that any of the speakers in what became a weekly lecture series expected their talks to be more widely disseminated (although some, including several of those collected here, have in one form or other already been published).

K.D.D. Henderson's credentials for a piece on "How to Understand English Poetry" (pp. 24-33) or E.J.N. Wallis's on "Plato and the Greek Philosophers" (pp. 268-75) are unknown. A lecture by Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, the future prime minister ("The Possibility of Fusion between Eastern and Western Culture", pp. 34-40) is of more interest for its political than its cultural significance. But G.C. Scott's "Aims of Education" (pp. 63-76) and "The Gordon College Today" (pp. 257-67); General Platt's "Retrospect" (pp. 235-47); A.J. Arkell's "Relations between Egypt and the Sudan at the Time of the Pharoahs" (pp. 345-56); Gifford Bey's lecture on the Eastern Arab Corps during the Abyssinian campaign (pp. 373-85); John Smith's "The Forest Resources of the Sudan" (pp. 41-53); Albert Hourani's, "The Arabs and Western Civilization" (pp. 315-28); and John Stone's brief notes on the economics of Africa (pp. 388-93; 394-400) are all by experts in their fields. But few of the pieces published here seem inspired by Newbold's Inaugural Lecture ("The Human Side of Culture", pp. 1-10): E.J.N. Wallis's "What Is Hitler's New Order?" (pp. 148-54) is an example. And whether because of his prominence, the editor's criteria for selection (which are never explained), or the lack of alternatives, E.S. Atiyah is represented here by five separate lectures.

The reader may glean from this assortment a sympathy with Newbold, whose humane spirit infused the Cultural Centre; an idea of the wide interests and vitality of British civil servants in the Sudan, even during wartime; a sense of the expertise Britain made available in the Sudan, especially in the technical services; and perhaps a certain slight embarrassment, in long hindsight, at the very earnestness or naivete of an elite cultural project soon to be overtaken by the sectarian politics, labour unrest, and demonstrations of the nationalist era.

The volume is handsomely produced, with an informative Introduction by Hassan Abbasher El Tayyeb, a Preface by Mahmoud Salih Osman Salih (under the auspices of whose Abdel Karim Mirghani Cultural Center the volume is published), and a brief foreword by Sir Donald Hawley, the editor. "Short Biographies of Contributors" (pp. 401-9) are marred by errors. There is no index. Another volume, of lectures delivered in Arabic, is anticipated.

M.W. Daly

Siena College

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Manuscripts are not normally returned to authors, but original material such as photographs will be returned.
It is helpful to have, very briefly (2-3 lines) any relevant details about the author - any post held, or time recently spent in the Sudan.
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[*] Single issues and back numbers may be obtained from the Hon. Secretary at a cost of £8 per copy.